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1 The book reviewed here makes available an important lecture on Hegel’s philosophy of
spirit that Dewey delivered at the University of Chicago in 1897. Less than one hundred
pages long, the lecture aimed to introduce students to a critical understanding of the
third  part  of  Hegel’s  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophical  Science.  It  is  preceded  by  two
introductory  essays  written  by  the  editors  –  namely,  Shook’s  Dewey’s  Naturalized
Philosophy of Spirit and Religion and Good’s Rereading Dewey’s “Permanent Hegelian Deposit.”
Broadly speaking,  they are devoted respectively a)  to  highlighting the fundamental
tenets of Dewey’s naturalistic philosophy of spirit and religion, and the different phases
through which he passed in turning from his original adhesion to Calvinism into his
later acceptance of humanistic naturalism; and b) to establishing the influence exerted
by  Hegel  on  Dewey’s  thought.  Their  immediate  function  consists  in  providing  a
contextualization  of  the  lecture,  both  in  the  light  of  Dewey’s  further  philosophical
development and in relation to his effort at coming to terms with the complex Anglo-
American idealist tradition in which he had been nurtured. 
2 This  contextualizing work is  particularly  welcomed.  In fact,  the decade that  Dewey
spent in Chicago (1894-1904) is undoubtedly the most enigmatic (and, at the very same
time, the most fascinating) period of his whole life; and it is highly probable that the
difficulties that Deweyan scholars usually encounter when dealing with it may affect
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the comprehension of  the lecture itself.  As  is  well  known,  the greatest  part  of  the
interpretative problems that arise quite naturally when a historical reconstruction of
Dewey’s  philosophical  development  is  attempted  are  due  to  Dewey’s  willingness  to
integrate different languages and perspectives into a single and coherent conceptual
framework. The direction of this long process of drifting away from Hegelianism is not
controversial:  the combination of  such different approaches as  theory of  evolution,
functional  psychology,  and  (plausibly,  but  this  is  a  highly  debated  point  among
interpreters)  Hegelian  idealism  eventually  drove  him  to  abandon  his  early  neo-
Hegelianism  in  favor  of  a  more  empirically  oriented,  experimental  account  of
experience  and thought.  What  is  still  lacking  is  precisely  an  accurate  study  of  the
history of his emancipation from neo-Hegelianism, and, more specifically, an account
of the role Hegel’s philosophy played in redirecting the course of Dewey’s philosophy.
3 From this viewpoint, the 1897 lecture on Hegel constitutes a fundamental source for
gaining  an  understanding  of  what  Dewey  was  aiming  at.  Undoubtedly,  it  provides
decisive  evidence  that,  at  the  end  of  19th century,  Dewey  still  viewed  Hegel  as  an
important philosophical  interlocutor.  Therefore,  any reading suggesting that Dewey
immersed  himself  in  the  study  of  contemporary  scientific  psychology  as  a  way  to
escape the pitfalls  of  German idealism can be  considered as  manifestly  unfounded.
However Shook and Good are not content with this minimal and rather uncontroversial
conclusion. On the contrary, they believe that a much stronger consequence can be
derived from Dewey’s interest in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. In their view, the latter
stands out as a reliable sign of Dewey being persuaded that a reflection on Hegelian
philosophy can supply him with powerful tools for achieving the goal of shaping his
new approach to philosophical problems (pp. vii-viii). More generally, the fundamental
assumption  lying  at  the  basis  of  Shook  and  Good’s  interpretation  is  that  Dewey’s
mature instrumentalism and naturalism – whose main tenets will first be announced to
the world  in  the  Studies  in  Logical  Theory  (1903),  and then further  developed in his
mature  works  –  cannot  be  properly  understood  unless  one  pays  attention  to  the
complex revision of Hegelianism that he had undertaken during the 90’s, of which the
1897 lecture on Hegel is a remarkable moment. As is evident, the latter thesis is much
more  difficult  to  defend,  because  it  involves  some very  strong  methodological  and
interpretative assumptions –  such as  the grounding hypothesis  that  this  lecture on
Hegel  provides  some  valuable  insights  having  direct  bearings  on  a  correct
interpretation of  Dewey’s  philosophy.  Indeed,  it  is  evident  that  Dewey’s  lecture  on
Hegel is avowedly expository: in many cases, he seems to limit himself to reporting
Hegel’s  argument,  rather  than  trying  to  express  his  own  philosophical  position.
Therefore,  it  would  be  rash  (to  say  the  least)  to  conclude  that  Dewey  is  actually
defending all the theses that he expounds, because it would entail that he is willing to
endorse the whole Hegelian philosophy of spirit. Obviously, Shook and Good are aware
of these problems, and they attempt to prevent possible objections by appealing to a
modest interpretative strategy, which prescribes a more cautious approach to the text.
Its  leading principle is  that a correct evaluation of  the theoretical  relevance of  the
lecture can be gained only through a continuous reference to the other books and
articles that Dewey wrote in the very same years, as well as in his mature phase. It is
indisputably  true that  when Dewey’s  lecture  on Hegel  is  presented as  a  tile  in  the
complex mosaic formed by his overall production, the picture that Shook and Good aim
to defend becomes much more convincing.
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4 This last remark sheds light on an aspect which should not be overlooked. It is worth
noting indeed that the book in its entirety is intended to have a militant tone, so that
some of its most interesting features risk to passing unnoticed if it is read and used as a
critical edition, with textual apparatus and commentary. In the Preface of the volume,
the editors write that there is a “debate, which shows no sign of abating even now,
about the extent to which his later works contain a mixture of Hegelian and pragmatist
element” (vii). Since Sterling Lamprecht’s article on the idealist source of Dewey’s logic
(1925),1 scholars have been discussing the plausibility of an idealist reading of Dewey’s
philosophy;  and  since  Morton  White’s  widely  influential  book  The  Origin  of  Dewey’s
Instrumentalism,2 it has become common to argue that “[Dewey] made a complete break
from Hegelianism around the turn of the century” (vii). Now, the editors claim that this
image  takes  Deweyan  scholars  captive,  because  it  prevents  them  from  seeing  that
Dewey’s philosophical development is much more complicated and nuanced than has
typically been considered. The two editors have devoted their greatest efforts,  both
historical and theoretical, to the criticism of this standard interpretation. The results of
their previous research – which is condensed in two seminal books, namely Shook’s
Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality and Good’s A Search for Unity in Diversity3 
– lay the ground for understanding the reasons for which they ascribe such importance
to this text. Thanks to their groundbreaking work on Dewey’s intellectual sources, the
two editors of the present volume did manage to dramatically change the shape of
Deweyan scholarship, by setting a new agenda of issues that deserve attention. It is now
widely accepted that a distinction should be drawn between Hegel and neo-Hegelians;
that  the  greatest  attention should  be  paid  to  the  strictly  philosophical (not  simply
personal) influence exerted on Dewey by the St. Louis  Hegelians;  that  Dewey never
abandoned idealism, but rather undertook an original attempt to naturalize its main
tenets; that his reading of William James’ Principles of Psychology did not represent a
radical break in his philosophical development, but on the contrary acted as a spur that
allowed  him  to  refine  those  original  insights  which  he  had  formulated  during  his
idealist apprenticeship; that Dewey does not belong to the pragmatist tradition, and
that his realization of Peirce’s relevance for his own philosophical project has to be
dated to the second decade of the 20th century. It is in light of this complex framework
that the proper significance of the text here presented, and the multi-faceted motives
that prompted Shook and Good to edit it, stand out in their clarity. The proper function
of Dewey’s lecture on Hegel is that of confirming – somehow indirectly, because of its
expository  nature  –  a  very  complex  and  articulated  historical  and  philosophical
interpretation whose main tenets are formulated elsewhere, namely in those books and
articles through which Shook and Good took part in the still ongoing debate on Dewey’s
early philosophy and, in general, his overall philosophical development.
5 Once the militant tone of the publication has been highlighted – pointing out that the
philosophical  value  of  the  whole  book  lies as  much  in  its  bearing  on  Deweyan
scholarship  as  in  the  results  that  the  concrete  work  of  historical  reconstruction
achieves –, and its main theoretical coordinates have been defined, it is possible to start
the discussion proper. I intend to proceed as follows. First of all, I will discuss briefly
the  main  points  of  Dewey’s  lecture  on  Hegel,  relying  on  the  illuminating  remarks
provided by Good in his essay, which, amongst other things, is a very useful guide to
reading  Dewey’s  text.  Trying  to  summarize  Dewey’s  exposition  would  be  useless,
because, in many cases, it would amount to a mere repetition of Hegel’s arguments. So,
I will limit myself to underline those aspects that have the greatest significance in the
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economy of  Dewey’s  thought,  and,  consequently,  provide  the  best  standpoint  from
which to understand the permanent deposit Hegelianism left on Deweyan philosophy.
After that, I will focus my attention on a couple of points which – though they have not
been stressed enough – corroborate the interpretation that Good advances. Moreover, I
will raise objections to two theoretical assumptions that I think are not fully supported
by facts,  but that are accepted by both Good and Shook. Then I  will  outline what I
believe to be the most interesting aspects of Shook’s argument. The decision not to
follow the publication order of the essays is a direct consequence of their different
“proximity” to the subject  matter  of  the lecture.  Indeed,  while  Good’s  contribution
wrestles  closely  with the  text,  Shook looks  at  it  from some distance.  The different
perspective  points  adopted  by  Good  and  Shook  yield  an  intriguing  result:  they
respectively provides a foreground and a background knowledge of Dewey’s complex
relationship  with  Hegelian  philosophy.  The  best  description  of  the  theoretical
presuppositions  and  objectives  of  their  deliberate  division  of  work  is  given  by  the
editors themselves in the Preface of the volume: 
We propose in our chapters to explore Dewey’s philosophy of religion in general
and his inheritance from Hegel of a ‘philosophy of spirit’ in particular. We agree
that Dewey did have a philosophy of spirit, that it was heavily indebted to Hegelian
themes, and that Dewey’s resulting philosophy of religion is a key component of his
social and political theory. (ix)
6 Finally,  I  will  express  a  general  reservation  concerning  a  methodological  and
interpretative assumption that the editors accept without questioning, but which is – in
my  opinion  –  in  need  of  revision.  Obviously,  the  revision  is  not  intended  to  be  a
rejection of their approach, but rather an attempt of refining some of the theoretical
presuppositions that lie at the basis of the conclusions they draw from their analysis of
Dewey’s lecture on Hegel. 
7 As has already been remarked, the lecture is characterized by an expository approach
to  its  subject  matter.  For  this  reason,  Dewey  integrates  his  exposition  of  Hegel’s
philosophy of  spirit  with pieces of  information about his  life  and with a schematic
account of Hegel’s most important theses of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Consequently,
Dewey’s lecture is naturally divided into three parts. The first thirty-four paragraphs
are devoted to highlighting the main events of Hegel’s boyhood, his formation at the
seminary in Tübingen,  and his  philosophical  development during the years that  he
spent as a private tutor in Berne and Frankfurt. The three central paragraphs focus on
the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit:  Dewey’s  main  interest  here  concerns  the  philosophical
reasons that led Hegel to break with his former friend Schelling. From paragraph 38 to
paragraph  155  Dewey  presents  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Spirit,  and,  as  Good  observes,
“Dewey closely tracks Hegel’s outline” (73).
8 According  to  Good,  three  aspects  deserve  particular  attention.  To  begin  with,  it  is
worth noting that the most original part of the lecture is the first one. Indeed, freed
from the necessity of following the course of Hegel’s argument, Dewey formulates what
he believes are the fundamental  tenets  of  Hegelian philosophy.  Therefore,  it  is  the
opening section that one has to take into consideration in order to see which Hegelian
themes drew Dewey’s attention, and what image of Hegel he intended to propose to his
students. Dewey defines Hegel as a “great actualist,” meaning with this expression that
Hegel  “had the  greatest  respect,  both  in  his  thought  and in  his  practice,  for  what
actually  amounted to  something,  actually  succeeded in getting outward form” (97).
Good rightly remarks that nothing is more distant from Dewey than the often-repeated
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charges that Hegel’s idealism is a reduction of the external world to mind, or that it
betrays the concreteness of experience. Hegel, Dewey argues, is “never more hard in
his speech, hard as steel is hard, than when dealing with mere ideals, vain opinions and
sentiments and sentiments which have not succeeded in connecting themselves with
this actual world” (97). It is not a case that Dewey pays the greatest attention to an
interesting trait of Hegel’s method: “self-effacement [is] the first law of the intellect”
(94).  Individual  opinions  must  be  suppressed  in  order  to  let  things  speak  for
themselves, because “the highest activity of thought is that which will make itself the
pure expression of the facts” (95). If these assertions are put in relation with Dewey’s
powerful insight that, for Hegel, “thinking is simply the translation of fact into its real
meaning”  (96),  a  clear  image  begins  to  take  shape.  Dewey  does  not  lean  toward  a
metaphysical  reading  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  of  spirit;  on  the  contrary,  he  is
fascinated by those realistic aspects of Hegel’s thought that found an objective, non-
spectatorial theory of knowledge. Good implicitly suggests that if one were compelled
to indicate the single Hegelian theme that left the greatest deposit on Dewey’s mature
philosophy, the actualist conception of thought would probably be the most natural
choice. The fact that Dewey stresses Hegel’s rejection of the idea of mind as passive
spectator  is  remarkable  since,  to  use  Good’s  words,  “the  rejection  of  mind/body
dualism,  faculty  psychology,  and the  passive  spectator  theory  of  knowledge  are  all
prominent features of Dewey’s mature thought” (64). 
9 Secondly,  Good  informs  the  reader  that  Dewey’s  sketch  of  Hegel’s  philosophical
development relies  mainly on three sources:  Caird’s  book on Hegel,  from which he
quotes  extensively,  Royce’s  articles  on  German  philosophy,  and  Rosenkranz’s
groundbreaking monography entitled Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Leben. According to
Good,  Dewey’s  highly selective use of  secondary literature is  remarkable because it
provides evidence that he consciously decided to exploit only those texts which were
functional  to  the  constitution  of  his  anti-metaphysical  reading  of  Hegel.  For  this
reason, for instance, Dewey does not mention Rudolf Haym’s Hegel und Seine Zeit,  in
which a reading of Hegel’s thought as the official philosophy of Prussian conservatism
is  formulated.  On  the  contrary,  precisely  because  of  its  insistence  on  Hegel’s
appreciation  for  the  concreteness  of  life,  Dewey  cannot  help  but  appreciating  the
account of Hegelian philosophy provided by Rosenkranz – a major representative of the
Center Hegelians who defended a third way alternative to the conservatism of the right
wing  Hegelians  as  well  as  the  atheist  and  revolutionary  thought  of  the  left  wing
Hegelians. It was Rosenkranz who, having gained access to Hegel’s early unpublished
writings and to his short political essays, was able to elaborate an image of his whole
work  as  a  grandiose  attempt  to  come  to  terms  with  the  “problems  raised  by  the
emergence of modern thought and culture” (62-3). By exploiting Rosenkranz’s insights
on the fundamental tone of Hegelian philosophy, Dewey lays stress upon the fact that,
contrary  to  Kant  and  Fichte,  “Hegel’s  original  impulse  was  not  from  the  study  of
philosophy  as  such”  (108).  Obviously,  Dewey  does  not  intend  to  deny  that  Hegel
eventually  came  to  express  his  ideas  in  a  highly  technical  language;  however,  the
problems  that  prompted  Hegel  to  undertake  serious  studies  were  not  strictly
philosophical, but rather political, historical, and theological. Good rightly puts great
emphasis on Dewey’s insistence on this fact: it is a sign that apart from any specific
agreement on particular issues, Dewey’s acceptance of Hegel’s philosophy is based on a
profound  sympathy  with  the  spirit  and  intentions  that  animate  Hegel’s  thought.
Moreover, it sheds light on the type of philosophical work Dewey considered worth
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carrying out, as well as on the kind of philosopher he aimed at becoming: according to
Dewey, the genuine philosopher is the one who faces the true problems of life, without
losing himself in technicalities that have no bearing on the solution of the concrete
difficulties that men encounter in their daily experience. 
10 The third point to which Good draws the attention is Dewey’s interest in Hegel’s theory
of causation. Good remarks that Dewey believes this theme to be so important that he
decides to digress from the argument of Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind in order to clarify its
theoretical relevance. As is well known, in his logical texts Hegel distinguishes between
two different ways of conceiving the relation of cause to effect: the point of view of
understanding and the point of view of reason. While the understanding severs the
connection  between  causes  and  their  effects,  assuming  that  they  are  ontologically
independent, reason shows their intimate unity, by pointing out that they are simple
moments within an organic process. No ontological distinction can be drawn between
them because a cause becomes a cause only when it  produces its  effect.  Therefore,
Hegel  argues  that,  to  use  Good’s  incisive  expression,  “cause  and  effect  are  more
fruitfully  seen as  reciprocal  moments  within  an organic  process  rather  than linear
relations” (75). Dewey enthusiastically endorses the Hegelian theory of causation, and
puts it at the basis of his own conception of reality, life, and reason. So, for instance,
Dewey writes: “each member of the animal body is cause and effect of every other: each
organ is at once means and ends of every other” (115). Moreover, the organicist theory
of  causation  is  also  the  key  to  understanding  Dewey’s  theory  of  emotion  and  his
concomitant critique of mind/body dualism. Strangely enough, Good deals with it only
incidentally,  but  this  aspect  is  so  relevant  that  it  should  have  deserved  a  larger
treatment than a few lines in a footnote. In fact, Dewey’s rejection of the Darwinian
“expressionist” conception of emotion – according to which emotions are ontologically
and epistemically independent from their bodily expressions – relies precisely upon the
refusal of distinguishing between an inner cause (the emotion) and an outer effect (the
organic modification). Finally, Dewey’s organicist view of the means-ends relationship
reflects the very same logic of Hegel’s organicist theory of causation: as a cause is a
cause if and only if it produces its effect, so a means is a means only because it actually
leads to the end in which it finds its complete realization. Thence, the Deweyan theory
of rationality, as expounded in Logic: Theory of Inquiry and in Theory of Valuation, should
not be seen as departing from his early idealism; on the contrary, it is a variation on the
theme of the Hegelian insistence on the essential continuity between cause and effect.
11 Two brief remarks and a reservation may be added to complete what has been said.
First of all, contrary to William Wallace’s translation decision, Dewey uses Spirit rather
than Mind in  order  to  express  the  German word Geist.  Through this  terminological
choice,  Dewey  aims  at  preventing  any  mentalistic  reading  of  Hegelian  philosophy
grounded  upon  an  erroneous  assimilation  of  Hegel’s  conceptual  framework  to  a
Berkeleyan-like  subjective  idealism.  Therefore,  Good’s  interpretation  is  not  only
plausible and consistent from a theoretical point of view; it is also founded on sound
textual evidence. Secondly, Dewey puts great emphasis on the notion of meaning as the
key to understanding the essence of Hegel’s philosophy. From the very beginning of his
philosophical career – at least from Knowledge as Idealization (1887) –, Dewey had been
devoting great effort to clarify those intellectual operations through which sensuous
material  is  enriched by  new meaning.  Accordingly,  when he  states  that,  for  Hegel,
“thinking  is  the  translation  of  fact  into  its  real  meaning”  (96),  Dewey  is  reading
Hegelian philosophy through the spectacles of his previous theoretical achievements:
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by doing so, he focuses his attention on the centrality of the process of idealization for
a full-fledged idealism. Meaning and idealization are two intertwined threads that run
through Dewey’s early production, and lie at the basis of his mature attempt of defining
the relationship  between primary and secondary experience.  What  is  worth noting
here is  that,  since Dewey’s  confrontation with Hegel  concerns precisely the way to
account for the relationship existing amongst thought,  meaning,  and reality,  it  is  a
pivotal episode in the history of Dewey’s theoretical effort to formulate a consistent
account  of  meaningfulness  of  experience.  Indeed,  Dewey  found  in  Hegel’s  absolute
idealism a fully developed theory of objective reason, thanks to which he managed to
overcome those pitfalls which stem from the dualistic assumptions that had infected,
among others, Kant and T. Hill Green’s critical idealism. Consequently, Good is right in
highlighting that Dewey’s emancipation from the specific  brand of  neo-Hegelianism
developed  by  Green  cannot  be  understood  unless  one  pays  attention  to  the
contribution afforded by his assimilation of Hegel’s thought. 
12 What I find less convincing in Good’s argument is the too sharp distinction that he
draws between Hegel and Neo-Hegelianism, and his thesis (shared by Shook) that the
young Dewey “made the same sort of Kantian move as the British neo-Hegelians” by
appealing to the idea of “perfect personality […] as a way to ground philosophy” (58).
Starting with the first issue, it is important to note that, far from being a monolithic
reality, neo-Hegelianism was a highly complex movement of thought, which refuses to
be boiled down to a set of doctrines held by all its members. This is particularly evident
when books and articles  written by neo-Hegelians during the 1880’s  are taken into
account. Indeed, in 1883 Francis Bradley publishes the first edition of his Principles of
Logic:  in  the  preface  he  explicitly  affirms that  “I  never  could  have  called  myself  a
Hegelian,  partly  because I  can not  say that  I  have mastered his  system, and partly
because I could not accept what seems his main principle”; and he adds that “as for the
‘Hegelian School’  which exists  in  our  reviews,  I  know no one who has  met  with it
anywhere else.”4 In 1887 Andrew Seth publishes his Hegelianism and Personality, in which
Absolute  Idealism is  rejected in  favor  of  a  form of  personalism largely  indebted to
Leibniz’s idea of monadology.5 One year later, Haldane replies to Seth’s criticism by
reminding him of the original spirit of neo-Kantianism – a label used by Haldane to
refer to the very same historical fact that Good and Shook name neo-Hegelianism –,
that is, its being an analysis of actual knowledge rather than a metaphysical theory of
reality.6 Therefore, to assume that Dewey was opposed to neo-Hegelianism überhaupt 
would  be  a  too  simplistic  interpretation  of  his  relationship  with  the  philosophical
tradition in which he grew up. 
13 The impression that Dewey’s rejection of neo-Hegelianism is wholesale is probably due
to a partial misreading of an important letter to William James, dated May 05, 1891.
While discussing the well-known passage of the Principles of Psychology, in which James
criticizes  neo-Hegelian  theory  of  consciousness  as  formulated by  Green  and  Caird,
Dewey states that “Hegel seems to me intensely modern in spirit […], and I do not like
to see him dressed up as Scholasticus Redivivus – although of course his friends, the
professed Hegelians,  are mainly responsible for that.” Now, it  is  true that Dewey is
willing  to  draw  a  distinction  between  Hegel  and  (some  of)  his  Anglo-American
followers.  However,  as the rest of  the letter shows rather clearly,  the distinction is
much less radical than it may seem at first glance. Indeed, contrary to James’ general
criticism,  Dewey  is  careful  to  distinguish  Green’s  neo-Kantian  and,  consequently,
substantially dualistic analysis of consciousness from Caird’s Hegelian-inspired theory
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of self. What Dewey is aiming at, therefore, is less to contrast Hegel and neo-Hegelians
than to defend his own position from James’ attack. In the context of his discussion
with James, Dewey prefers to use the terms of his opponents, and to clarify his own
view – which is strongly dependent on Caird’s version of absolute idealism – through a
redefinition  of  those  assumptions  that  led  James  to  that  erroneous  theoretical
conclusion. 
14 In any case, from what has been said, it does not follow that Good’s distinction between
Hegel’s philosophy and neo-Hegelianism is illegitimate and completely useless from a
historiographical point of view. In reality, it is worth being preserved for at least one
fundamental  reason.  It  highlights the  fact  that  one  cannot  understand  Dewey’s
“psychological”  version  of  absolute  idealism  unless  attention  is  paid  to  the  Anglo-
American  philosophical  tradition  in  whose  terms  he  came  to  assimilate  Hegel’s
thought. Indeed, the philosophical problems Dewey perceived as being the most urgent
are  not  identical  to  those  with  which  Hegel  was  concerned.  Three  differences  are
particularly  relevant  here.  First  of  all,  the  extremely  rapid  development  of
psychological  and  biological  sciences  put  the  problem  of  providing  an  account  of
perception at  the center  of  philosophical  concerns.  Secondly,  Hegel’s  philosophy of
objective  spirit  became  a  widely  accepted  theoretical  platform  that  supplied
sociologists,  linguists,  and  anthropologists  with  a  sound  conceptual  framework.
Philosophers as different as Comte and Hegel could be read as recommending the same
solution to the issues concerning the nature of society, and the relevance of the latter
for the genesis of individual mind. Thirdly, Hegelian philosophy was interpreted as a
powerful tool for defending a religious view of the world. Indeed, Hegel’s multifaceted
concept of spirit was transformed into a metaphysical notion that supported a strong
claim concerning the essence of reality. When all these things are considered, it then
becomes possible to fully appreciate the historiographical importance of the distinction
drawn by Good between Hegelian philosophy and the neo-Hegelian tradition: it makes
clear that Dewey’s reading of Hegel was neo-Hegelian, and that even in those cases in
which he contrasted Hegel’s original doctrines with some idiosyncratic theses upheld
by some of the neo-Hegelians, he was still moving within a distinctively neo-Hegelian
framework.
15 All of these previous remarks shed an important light on Dewey’s problematic use of
the notion of personality. Good and Shook agree that Dewey’s exploitation of the notion
of perfect personality in his early writings – and, in particular, in his Psychology (1887) –
is a reliable sign of his adherence to some form of neo-Hegelianism; and they maintain
that  it  is  only  through  its  rejection  that  Dewey  eventually  came  to  formulate  a
consistent approach to the problems of ethics and logic. It is undoubtedly true that
during the 1890’s Dewey’s philosophy was idealistic, but the shift of attention from the
abstractness of his early metaphysical and theological concerns to concrete facts of life
paved the way to the development of his later naturalism. In such a reconstruction, the
concept  of  perfect  personality  acts  as  a  stumbling  block  to  the  growth of  Dewey’s
philosophy.  What is  even more important  to  note is  that,  according to  Good,  what
prevented the young Dewey from formulating a thorough idealistic  philosophy was
that, at that time, he was too Kantian to abandon the view elaborated by British neo-
Hegelians. Good’s reconstruction goes on as follows: “As he began to criticize the neo-
Hegelians,  Dewey  jettisoned  the  notion  of  a  transcendent  absolute  that  grounded
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philosophy […]. Rather than a move away from Hegel’s absolute idealism, this was a
move away from neo-Hegelianism and toward Hegel” (58-9).
16 No one should deny that the very idea of perfect personality is a key neo-Hegelian
notion.  Moreover,  it  is  also  evident  that,  sometimes  and  especially  in  his  popular
writings, Dewey tends to give a religious tinge to his philosophical theses. By doing so,
the wrong impression may be conveyed that in his early phase he was concerned with a
quest for a philosophical foundation of Christian belief in a divine personal God. In
reality,  Dewey’s  appeal  to  the  notion  of  perfect  personality  is  part  of  a  complex
theoretical strategy aiming at correcting the intrinsic dualism of such neo-Kantians as
Thomas  Hill  Green.  Dewey  gives  the  following  definition  of  the  idea  of  perfect
personality: it is “the motive, source, and the realization of the life of the individual”
(EW 2: 361). Perfect will is, therefore, the absolute standpoint an agent has to endorse to
avoid  inconsistencies  caused  by  the  Kantian  unwillingness  to  discard  the  dogmatic
assumption that human reason and will are finite and limited by the existence of a
thing-in-itself. That this is Dewey’s aim is confirmed by the following remark: when the
perfect will is recognized by an agent as the motive of his action, “the source of his
concrete actions is no longer the will that the ideal and the actual ought to be one […],
but it is the will that they are one; and this specific case […] is the manifestation of this
unity”  (EW  2: 361).  Seen  from  this  perspective,  far  from  being  a  residual  of  neo-
Kantianism as the editors of the book maintain, Dewey’s notion of pure personality
stands out as the single theoretical device that warrants the validity of the process of
idealization of sensations or, in other words, the process of embodiment of the ideal in
material.  If  this  reading  is  correct,  an  even  stronger  continuity  in  Dewey’s
philosophical  development  can  be  detected.  It  follows  indeed  that  Dewey  never
changed his mind about the general philosophical standpoint that should be adopted in
order to formulate a sound idealistic philosophy. What Dewey recognized as inadequate
and in need of revision is, rather, the technical, specific theory of mental activity that
was  intended  to  substantiate  that  general  standpoint.  It  is  at  that  level  that  the
theoretical import of Dewey’s assimilation of Hegel’s philosophy becomes evident, as
has been proven by Good’s brilliant analysis.
17 Obviously, the reservations advanced here do not affect the value of Good’s argument.
Indeed, his reconstruction of Dewey’s argument is faithful, and the overall picture of
what the permanent Hegelian deposit on Deweyan philosophy amounts to is convincing
and  stimulating.  The  philosophical value  of  his  account  consists  in  the  fact  that  it
provides a reliable canon of exegetical interpretation that directs and controls specific
theoretical research. So, for instance, it explains in which sense, and to which extent, it
is appropriate to encompass both Hegel’s and Dewey’s later thought under the label of
organicism and actualism. At the same time, it corroborates what at first glance may
seem a mere suggestion, namely Good’s assertion that 
when Dewey reflects on the psychology of  individual  humans,  in works such as
Human Nature  and  Conduct,  he  articulates  a  philosophy  of  subject  spirit,”  and
“when  he  reflects  on  the  history  of  Western  civilization,  in  works  such  as
Reconstruction  in  Philosophy  and  The  Quest  for  Certainty,  he  develops  a
philosophy of objective spirit. (60)
18 An accurate historical account paves the way to a more sophisticated and controlled
evaluation  of  possible  theoretical  similarities  between  the  two  later  philosophical
proposals. 
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19 It  would be erroneous,  however,  to  conclude that  Hegel’s  influence on Dewey boils
down to its effects on the development of the latter’s philosophical outlook. Indeed, it
was Dewey himself who called attention to the emotional, non-intellectual significance
of his encounter with Hegel. In From Absolutism to Experimentalism,  Dewey states that
“Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and human, was,
however, no mere intellectual formula: it operated as an immense release, a liberation”
(LW5:  153).  Therefore,  any  account  that  overlooks  this  “existential”  aspect  of  the
Hegelian influence on Dewey would be unsatisfactory because of its incompleteness.
Among many other things, Shook’s Dewey’s Naturalized Philosophy of Spirit and Religion
intends precisely to highlight how Hegelian philosophy interacts and merges with the
whole body of Dewey’s religious and ethical convictions, which were formed before he
came in contact with Hegel and the neo-Hegelian tradition. Accordingly, it aims a) to
outline the fundamental traits of Dewey’s implicit metaphysics, b) to shed some light
on those assumptions that Dewey never discussed or criticized, but that unconsciously
shaped his whole philosophical outlook, and c) to point out the intellectual debates in
which  Dewey  took  part,  and  in  reference  to  which  he  elaborated  and  refined  his
conceptual apparatus.
20 Shook supplies the reader with an intriguing narration about what he calls “Dewey’s
evolving stance about religion” (7). He distinguishes four phases of Dewey’s philosophy
of  religion  and  spirit.  1)  Dewey’s  early  devotion  to  Christianity  was  decisively
influenced by his mother’s adhesion to New England Congregationalism, even though
he gradually came to prefer “the anti-Calvinistic themes of universalism” (6). The first
years of his life were characterized by an “instinctive trust in democracy and sympathy
with universalism” (20). 2) During the years spent at the University of Vermont, he
realized  for  the  first  time  that  universalism  and  democracy  support  each  other,
although he was not ready yet to formulate a comprehensive philosophical view of how
they hang together. 3) It was in the light of these interests and theoretical concerns
that  Dewey  assimilated  Morris’  Hegelian  organicist  philosophy.  The  theory  of
progressive self-realization that Dewey first expounded in his Psychology is the most
visible fruit of his effort to develop a consistent idealistic view of the place of religion
in man’s life. Therefore, it was Hegel who provided Dewey with a set of concepts that
made it possible to satisfy what Dewey himself calls an intense emotional craving for
unity (LW 5: 153). 4) Starting from the end of 19th century, Dewey jettisoned any
remnant  of  theological  language,  and  declined  his  idealistic  convictions  within  a
naturalistic  framework.  As  Shook  rightly  remarks,  “having  integrated  faith,
responsibility, and society,” and having developed a sound logic of inquiry, “Dewey’s
mature  philosophy  offers  a  unified  and  coherent  theory  of  religion,  morality,  and
politics” (20).
21 The reconstruction articulated by Shook makes evident in which sense, and to what
extent,  Dewey’s  “humanistic  naturalism  is  the  culmination  of  [his]  search  for  a
philosophy of spirit” (20).  Shook’s main theses are a) that Dewey’s later philosophy
plunges its roots in the theological debate in which he took part in the last decades of
the 19th century, and b) that Dewey’s mature formulations are best understood when
seen as more conscious attempts to answer the very same problems that prompted him
to study philosophy and to accept the Anglo-American version of Hegelian idealism. So,
for  instance,  Shook rightly  notices  that  the  opposition between the  two schools  of
social reform that Dewey discusses at length in Human Nature and Conduct parallels the
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contrast between libertarianism and determinism that was common in the Calvinistic
circles in which Dewey was reared. At the same time, Shook highlights that Dewey’s
solution  to  this  problem  relies  upon  his  exploitation  of  the  Hegelian  idea  of  self-
realization,  once  due  attention  is  paid  to  the  fact  that,  as  a  consequence  of  his
insistence on the idea of natural and social environment, Dewey’s mature concept of
self-realization is  much more naturalistically oriented than his  early version of  the
same notion. Even more evident is  Hegel’s  influence on Dewey’s theory of religious
experience as formulated in A Common Faith.  As Shook incisively remarks,  “Dewey’s
theory  of  the  divine  represents  a  pragmatic  development  of  the  Hegelian  organic
metaphysics that he had sought early in his career” (31). 
22 In  addition,  Shook’s  work  has  far-reaching  methodological  implications.  Indeed,
leaving aside the specific results obtained, it is worth noting from a historiographical
point  of  view that  in  this  contribution a  description is  provided of  the  “emotional
reasons” that guided Dewey to his views on religion, democracy, and morality. By doing
so,  Shook  supplies  a  new  additional  perspective  that  puts  into  sharper  focus  the
significance  of  Dewey’s  creative  assimilation  of  influences  from  his  intellectual
environment,  such  as,  to  name  only  the  most  important  ones,  James’  biological
psychology and Santayana’s idealistic naturalism. 
23 In conclusion, Shook and Good’s reconstruction of Dewey’s intellectual development,
and their provocative account of his later humanistic naturalism, shake the traditional
image of Dewey’s philosophy to its very foundations. Indeed, the ultimate aim of their
work consists in putting Dewey scholarship on new, sounder footing characterized by a
rigorous investigation of the different sources of Dewey’s thought and an approach
more sensitive to its  historical  conditioning.  It  is  not rash to say that the concrete
results obtained in the present book show that this goal has been achieved in the main.
What remains to be done is – at least in my opinion – to cast some legitimate doubt on
the  historiographical validity  of  the  autobiographical  article  From  Absolutism  to
Experimentalism, which both Shook and Good seem to use as an unproblematic source of
information about Dewey’s life and career. It is undoubtedly true, as Shook has pointed
out  in  Dewey’s  Empirical  Theory  of  Knowledge  and  Reality,7 that  Dewey’s  sketchy
description of his years of philosophical apprenticeship as a long drifting away from
Hegelianism has  been an important  factor  in  determining the  abandonment  of  the
traditional  image  revolving  around  the  conviction  that  Dewey’s  philosophy
experienced a sudden, sharp, and quite inexplicable reversal somewhere between 1893
and 1896. However, since the traditional image does not hold us captive anymore, it is
possible to proceed further, and criticize a tool that has been very useful, but may now
turn into a stumbling block for future research. Obviously, this does not amount to
saying that the autobiographical reconstruction that Dewey outlined in From Absolutism
to  Experimentalism is false.  What  I  am  suggesting  is,  rather,  that  Deweyan  scholars
should be more sensitive to the context in which Dewey wrote that article, and pay
more attention to the goal that he was trying to reach. Originally published in a volume
entitled Contemporary American Philosophy (1930), From Absolutism to Experimentalism is a
militant article, in which Dewey wants less to offer a faithful account of his personal
philosophical  development  than  to  put  forward  an  interpretation  of  the  American
tradition, and of his own place within it. Dewey’s autobiographical sketch is vague, in
the  sense  of  being  general  enough  to  be  minimally  faithful  to  the  real  historical
circumstances,  and,  at  the  very  same  time,  plastic  enough  to  be  functional  to  the
creation of a narrative able to contrast, on a rhetorical level, the widespread diffusion
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of epistemology in North America during the 1920’s. Once the problems stemming from
Dewey’s  autobiographical  remarks  are  put  aside  –  such as,  to  name only  the  most
notable  ones,  the  confusing  vagueness  of  the  label  Hegelianism,  the  perplexing
declaration  that  “no  very  fundamental  vital  influence”  issued  from  books,  his
questionable assertion that James’ Principles of Psychology has dramatically influenced
his  thought  –,  it  should  be  easier  to  understand  more  clearly  some  controversial
aspects  of  his  philosophical  development.  In  my opinion,  two lines  of  research are
particularly interesting and promising. On the one hand, a rigorous analysis of the way
in which Dewey read James’ Principles of  Psychology, in the light of his knowledge of
state-of-the-art psychology and biology of the time; on the other hand, an inquiry into
Dewey’s place in the pragmatist tradition. The issues dealt with in the present book –
that is, Dewey’s assimilation of Hegel’s idealism in general, and his philosophy of spirit
in particular – play a pivotal role in both these histories.
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